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InTroDucTIon
At the December 2007 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali, Indonesia, negotiators overcame tremendous differences to agree on a “Bali Roadmap” 
process intended to determine a successor to the Kyoto Proto-
col to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (“UNFCCC”),1 whose current commitments to reduce 
global greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions expire in 2012.2 While 
the United States rejected the 
Kyoto Protocol,3 there appear to 
be decent prospects that it will 
join its post-2012 successor.4
Among other ambitious 
goals, the Bali Roadmap pro-
cess, through the “Bali Action 
Plan” agreement, calls for the 
development of both national 
and international measures to 
mitigate climate change, based 
on a “shared vision for long-
term cooperative action.”5 
However, reflecting a deep rift 
between developed and devel-
oping countries, the Bali Action 
Plan prescribes “common but 
differentiated responsibilities”6 
in which developed countries 
commit to quantified and veri-
fiable GHG emission reduc-
tions, but developing countries are only required to contribute 
“appropriate mitigation actions . . . in the context of sustainable 
development.”7 In short, under the Bali Roadmap, only devel-
oped countries must actually reduce GHG emissions.
This core doctrine of “common but differentiated respon-
sibilities” in the Bali Roadmap may have been politically indis-
pensable to reaching agreement in Bali, but it has substantial 
complicating implications for international trade in goods and 
the competitiveness of U.S. industries. The problem, in a phrase, 
is “carbon leakage.”8 If developed economies like the United 
States and EU impose higher costs on carbon dioxide (“CO2”) 
and other GHG emissions (the economic consequence of set-
ting and tightening caps on such emissions) than do developing 
countries, one result will be an incentive to shift GHG-intensive 
inteRnational tRaDe law anD the  
“caRbon leakage” pRoblem: 
aRe unilateRal u.S. impoRt ReStRictionS the Solution?
by Bernd G. Janzen*
* Bernd G. Janzen is Counsel in the International Trade Group at Akin Gump 
Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP in Washington, D.C.
In the United States, 
unilateral trade 
restrictions appear to be 
emerging as a mechanism 
of choice as Congress 
evaluates its options  
for legislating a solution  
to the carbon  
leakage problem. 
manufacturing from the former to the latter. This could lead to 
the reduction of such production in developed countries and an 
increase in exports of GHG-intensive goods from developing 
to developed countries.9 In the context of China’s massive and 
growing trade surpluses and its emergence as the world’s larg-
est emitter of CO2,
10 lawmakers in the United States and other 
developed countries face a tricky challenge—how to proceed 
with the urgent task of imposing 
meaningful national curbs on 
GHG emissions while ensuring 
that domestic industries are not 
disadvantaged by imports pro-
duced pursuant to less onerous 
emissions requirements.
In the United States, uni-
lateral trade restrictions appear 
to be emerging as a mechanism 
of choice as Congress evalu-
ates its options for legislating a 
solution to the carbon leakage 
problem. However, it is far from 
clear if the trade restrictions 
under consideration comply 
or conflict with current global 
trading rules under the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”). 
Such restrictions also do not 
appear to mesh well with U.S. 
trade policy, which generally 
favors trade liberalization. Uni-
laterally imposed national trade restrictions would also, at first 
blush, appear inconsistent with the goal established in the Bali 
Action Plan of a globally coordinated approach to the reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions. This Article examines the most 
visible proposed legislative solution to carbon leakage currently 
under consideration in the United States in light of WTO rules, 
U.S. trade policy, and the multilateral goals espoused in the Bali 
Action Plan. This Article also proposes that current U.S. trade 
remedy laws provide a useful analogy for understanding and 
addressing the concerns of domestic manufacturing industries as 
they grapple with the carbon leakage problem.
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regulaTIng u.s. ImporTs To ensure  
FaIr compeTITIon
Of the various recent legislative proposals that would reduce 
U.S. emissions of GHGs, the most prominent is the America’s 
Climate Security Act of 2007 (“ACSA”), introduced by Senators 
Joe Lieberman (D-CT) and John Warner (R-VA) on October 18, 
2007.11 ACSA would establish a national emissions cap on six 
GHGs, including CO2, which would decline from 2012 through 
2050,12 and would institute mechanisms to allocate emissions 
allowances to a range of covered U.S. GHG-emitting indus-
tries.13 Senators Lieberman and Warner introduced ACSA in the 
Senate two months prior to the release of the Bali Action Plan, 
and the ACSA is not expressly tied to that multilateral process. 
However, both measures are a clear reflection of the strong polit-
ical will in the United States 
and in many other countries to 
move quickly and in a globally 
coordinated fashion to reduce 
GHG emissions and stave off 
the worst expected effects of 
climate change.
Recognizing the adverse 
competitive effects that could 
result to U.S. manufacturing 
industries competing against 
foreign industries not subject 
to such measures—i.e., the car-
bon leakage problem—ACSA 
would require the Administra-
tion to urge other countries to 
adopt comparable measures to 
reduce GHG emissions.14 Oth-
erwise, U.S. industries would 
have systemically higher com-
pliance costs than their for-
eign competitors—and such an 
imbalance would only increase 
over time as U.S. emissions 
caps decline. But also recognizing that a globally coordinated 
approach to reducing GHG emissions may or may not occur, 
ACSA would, as of 2020, require importers of GHG-intensive 
products to declare to U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”) either that: (1) the imported goods are covered by spe-
cial international allowances created under ACSA,15 or (2) the 
exporting country is one deemed under ACSA to have taken 
measures to reduce GHG emissions comparable to those taken 
by the United States.16 The import provisions expressly cover 
GHG-intensive manufactured goods such as iron, steel, alumi-
num, cement, bulk glass, and paper, and would extend to any 
manufacturing production process that generates GHG emis-
sions “comparable” to the expressly covered products.17 Thus, 
ACSA has the obvious potential to impose very substantial 
compliance costs on U.S. importers of a wide range of manufac-
tured goods, and seems certain to alter the competitive balance 
between U.S. and foreign firms supplying ACSA-covered goods 
to the U.S. market. While these added import compliance costs 
(in essence, constituting a trade restriction) would be justified 
from the U.S. perspective as attempting to restore the competi-
tive balance of U.S. industries harmed by imports from coun-
tries with less stringent emissions restrictions, it seems unlikely 
that U.S. trading partners would willingly accept such unilateral 
import restrictions.
ACSA’s import restrictions are not the only type of mecha-
nism under consideration as the U.S. Congress examines how 
to address competitive disadvantages to U.S. industries result-
ing from the carbon leakage problem. The U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives Committee on Energy and Commerce identified 
two other possible mechanisms to address the competitiveness 
concerns for U.S. industry associated with carbon leakage in a 
widely cited January 2008 White 
Paper.18 One is the adoption of 
carbon intensity standards for 
energy-intensive products, which 
would apply to all such products 
sold in the United States regard-
less of their origin.19 Fees would 
presumably be imposed on prod-
ucts that do not meet those carbon 
intensity standards, to compel 
the sale in the United States of 
only those products that do meet 
those standards.20 The American 
Iron and Steel Institute and the 
Steel Manufacturers Association 
are major proponents of carbon 
intensity standards, and have 
criticized the proposed ACSA 
import mechanism for, among 
other things, encouraging foreign 
governments to provide subsidies 
to their exporters to the United 
States of greenhouse gas-inten-
sive goods.21
The third possible option for addressing carbon leakage 
identified in the White Paper would make foreign countries’ 
access to U.S. carbon markets contingent on their imposition of 
GHG emissions restrictions comparable to those adopted in the 
United States.22 Such incentives could take several forms, such 
as more generous terms of access for countries that agree more 
quickly to emissions caps comparable to those imposed in the 
United States.23 However, import restrictions along the lines of 
those proposed by ACSA, while contentious, are generally seen 
at this point as having the best chances of passage in the U.S. 
Congress.
The EU is also contemplating unilateral trade measures that 
could restrict imports as part of its ambitious drive to reduce 
carbon emissions across a wide range of industries by twenty 
percent by 2020.24 While no such import measure is currently 
in effect, EU leaders such as French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso have 
The EU is also 
contemplating unilateral 
trade measures that could 
restrict imports as part of 
its ambitious drive  
to reduce carbon emissions 
across a wide range  
of industries by twenty 
percent by 2020.
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repeatedly referred to the possibility of imposing a carbon tax 
or allowance requirement (similar to the scheme contemplated 
by ACSA) on imports from countries not in compliance with 
Kyoto Protocol emission reduction requirements (i.e., the United 
States).25 These suggestions have drawn strong criticism from 
U.S. trade officials, who warn that such proposals could facili-
tate WTO-inconsistent trade protectionism under the guise of 
environmental protection.26
Notably, the recent proposed directives of the European 
Commission that form the centerpiece of the ambitious EU cli-
mate change package do not, with certain limited exceptions, 
impose restrictions on imports.27 However, the economic burden 
of the carbon leakage problem is potentially just as acute for EU 
industries as it is for U.S. industries. It therefore seems inevitable 
that the EU will eventually need to contemplate some scheme 
akin to the ACSA import restrictions to address the competi-
tiveness concerns of its carbon-intensive industries as emissions 
restrictions begin to increase production costs. Indeed, Euro-
pean steelmakers recently threatened to delay expansion plans in 
Europe pending EU adoption of appropriate measures to account 
for the competitive impact of carbon-intensive imports.28
TesTIng acsa’s ImporT provIsIons unDer The 
wTo anD u.s. TraDe polIcy
The trade provisions of ACSA clearly raise the question of 
U.S. compliance with obligations under the WTO. The ques-
tion of WTO compliance has been at the forefront of Congress’ 
consideration of ACSA’s import measures.29 The debate poten-
tially implicates many aspects of the WTO Agreements, but 
centers around two core concepts: (1) the “national treatment” 
principle of Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (“GATT”), which, in essence, obligates WTO Members 
to ensure that imported goods are subjected to regulatory and 
tax treatment no more burdensome than the treatment to which 
the same goods, produced domestically, are subjected;30 and (2) 
the GATT Article XX defense, which allows WTO Members 
to take discriminatory action against imports where “neces-
sary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”—but only 
where such action does not constitute “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination” 31 or represent a disguised trade restriction.32 
GATT Article XX, the plain language of which does not seem 
to perfectly capture the concerns surrounding GHG emissions, 
is as close as the WTO Agreements come to permitting trade 
restrictions based on climate change mitigation.33 It remains 
unclear—and the source of considerable concern—whether U.S. 
laws such as ACSA would be vulnerable to attack from WTO 
Members alleging that ACSA discriminates against their exports 
to the United States, but that it does not meet the narrow GATT 
Article XX tests permitting such trade discrimination.34
In the most recent relevant case, involving a Brazilian ban 
on imports of retreaded tires, the WTO Appellate Body found 
that, while Brazil’s import ban constituted a permissible means 
of protecting human health, the fact that Brazil also permitted 
imports of retreaded tires from neighboring MERCOSUR coun-
tries resulted in trade discrimination not rationally connected to 
the human health objective of the import ban.35 Because of this 
absence of a rational connection between the objective of the 
import ban and the manner in which it was applied, the import 
ban did not satisfy the narrow GATT Article XX test. This most 
recent WTO decision—in particular the rational connection test 
applied by the WTO Appellate Body—provides an important 
roadmap for U.S. lawmakers crafting climate change legislation, 
but by no means answers whether ACSA or other such legis-
lation, once implemented, would pass the GATT Article XX 
test if challenged. As noted in the congressional White Paper 
discussed above, “while Congress has control over which trade-
related measure to include in a climate bill, the determination of 
such a provision’s legitimacy under WTO rules is out of U.S. 
hands.”36
The retaliation issue matters, because a loss at the WTO 
could mean the conferral on U.S. trading partners of substan-
tial retaliation rights. Previously stung by WTO losses pro-
viding substantial retaliation rights to the complaining WTO 
Members,37 U.S. law- and policy-makers are justifiably nervous 
about the possible outcome of a WTO challenge to ACSA’s 
import provisions.
ACSA’s import measures also are likely to re-activate the 
longstanding debate about whether the WTO Agreements pro-
hibit or allow trade regulation based on so-called processes and 
production methods (“PPMs”). The basic terms of the debate can 
be summarized in the following question: May WTO Members 
regulate imports based on the way a good is made (i.e., PPMs), 
or must WTO Members base such regulation on the physical 
attributes of the good in the condition as imported? It is easy to 
see why some might characterize ACSA’s import provisions as 
PPMs, as their application arguably hinges on the “emissions 
footprint” of the imported good, rather than its physical charac-
teristics at the time the good crosses the border.
The WTO jurisprudence to date does not provide a defini-
tive answer on the WTO-consistency of PPMs, and WTO experts 
are divided on the question. One recent commentator assembled 
a long list of statements supporting the view that PPMs can 
never (or almost never) be justified under WTO rules, and then 
proceeded to “debunk the myth of illegality.”38 The most com-
monly cited standards in WTO case law for analyzing PPMs are 
in the multiple decisions in the Shrimp-Turtle Case, in which 
India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand challenged a U.S. ban 
on the importation of shrimp caught in a manner that adversely 
affected threatened sea turtles. These complaining WTO Mem-
bers alleged, inter alia, that the ban violated the U.S. obliga-
tion under the WTO to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of 
imports from these countries.39 The U.S. defense turned on the 
application of GATT Article XX, described above.
One aspect of the WTO Appellate Body’s ultimate decision 
in the Shrimp-Turtle Case could be central to any future case 
challenging ACSA’s import provisions as WTO-inconsistent 
PPMs. In upholding a modified version of the U.S. import ban 
as consistent with GATT Article XX, the WTO Appellate Body 
concluded that a WTO Member can show that an import restric-
tion does not constitute “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion” for purposes of GATT Article XX if that WTO Member 
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attempts to negotiate an international agreement ensuring equal 
treatment of all affected trading partners. As the WTO Appel-
late Body explained, the key is not whether such an agreement 
is actually reached, but whether the WTO Member asserting 
a GATT Article XX defense has made a “serious, good faith 
effort” to reach such agreement.40
Given the ongoing interplay of U.S. legislative efforts to 
impose a national scheme to limit GHG emissions and the inter-
national UNFCCC process, it is too soon to say if the United 
States would be able to rely on the “international negotiation” 
defense of the Shrimp-Turtle Case. Notably, ACSA section 
6003 would require the United States to engage in international 
negotiations with the objective of coordinating global GHG 
emissions reductions in a manner consistent with the goals of 
ACSA. However, at this point we can only speculate if ACSA 
will even be enacted into law.
The Bush Administration also expressed concern that import 
restrictions like those proposed in ACSA pose trade policy prob-
lems beyond possible inconsistency with U.S. WTO obligations. 
As recently expressed by U.S. Trade Representative Susan C. 
Schwab, unilateral U.S. trade restrictions designed to compel 
reductions in foreign emissions of GHGs are “a blunt and impre-
cise instrument of fear” that could poison commercial relations 
and trigger retaliatory measures by U.S. trading partners.41 Such 
mirror actions could quickly harm U.S. exports, and could take 
years to resolve if challenged at the WTO.42
Rather, the consistent message from U.S. Trade Representa-
tive Schwab has been that, instead of crafting import restrictions 
that will somehow ensure a competitive, level playing field as 
countries commit to GHG reductions, the priority of the United 
States should be to harness trade liberalization to enhance the 
global distribution of goods and services that contribute to cli-
mate change mitigation. At the core of this effort are the ongoing 
WTO negotiations toward an Agreement on Trade in Environ-
mental Goods and Services (“EGSA”).43 The mandate for these 
negotiations, set out in the 2001 WTO Doha Declaration,44 is 
the “reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-
tariff barriers to environmental goods and services.”45 When 
originally conceived, this mandate did not expressly include cli-
mate change. Nor did the mandate provide any guidance on what 
goods and services should be deemed “environmental.” But the 
United States and many other WTO Members now view a multi-
lateral EGSA as an important tool in combating climate change, 
and state that this effort complements the UNFCCC process. As 
recently explained by U.S. Trade Representative Schwab, the 
current framework for such an agreement, as jointly proposed 
by the United States and the EU, would increase global trade in 
climate-friendly technologies (such as wind turbines and pho-
tovoltaic solar panels) by as much as fourteen percent, thereby 
contributing significantly to global reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions.46
As of this writing, the Administration and Congress appear 
to be headed for a show-down this year on ACSA’s import pro-
visions. As a practical matter, the debate seems likely to carry 
forward into a new Congress and Administration in 2009.
acsa anD u.s. TraDe remeDy law
Notwithstanding the possibility of claims that ACSA’s car-
bon leakage provisions may violate U.S. WTO obligations and 
send signals to U.S. trading partners inconsistent with current 
U.S. trade policy, the carbon leakage provisions may also be 
viewed as consistent in spirit with long-accepted norms under 
U.S. trade remedy laws.
Like many WTO Members, the United States maintains 
antidumping and countervailing duty laws that permit domestic 
industries to petition the government (or allow the government 
on its own initiative) to impose import duties to redress injuri-
ous import practices. Under the U.S. antidumping law, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (“DOC”) may order CBP to impose 
on imports antidumping duties in an amount equivalent to the 
difference between the actual import values, as adjusted under 
the statute, and their deemed “fair value.”47 Similarly, under the 
U.S. countervailing duty law, DOC may impose duties to offset 
subsidies provided by foreign governments to the extent they 
confer an unfair benefit on imports and certain other conditions 
are satisfied.48 These laws are expressly permitted by WTO 
rules,49 and are widely seen as a necessary escape clause from 
the presumption of trade liberalization that permitted the WTO 
Agreements to be reached in the first place.50
The trade-restrictive provisions of ACSA may be seen as 
expanding the universe of import practices that should be deemed 
“unfair” under U.S. law. As noted, international trade law, as 
reflected in both U.S. domestic law and the WTO system, rec-
ognizes that import pricing below certain levels (whether due to 
“dumping” by foreign exporters or subsidies provided by foreign 
governments) is a form of unfair trade that, when causing harm 
to domestic industries, may be redressed through import duties. 
This notion of unfair trade is based purely on how an imported 
product is priced. ACSA would arguably expand this accepted 
notion of unfair trade to take into account how imported prod-
ucts are made—specifically, the volume and nature of the GHGs 
associated with their manufacture. ACSA would, in essence, 
dictate that the price of U.S. imports reflects the externalized 
environmental costs of GHG emissions. Just as the U.S. anti-
dumping law provides a remedy to domestic manufacturers that 
must compete against unfairly low-priced, or “dumped,” imports, 
ACSA would provide a remedy to domestic manufacturers that 
must compete against imports that were manufactured under less 
stringent GHG emissions standards—in other words, a remedy 
against a newly recognized form of environmental dumping.
However, unlike the U.S. antidumping and countervailing 
duty laws—which cover approximately one percent of the total 
value of U.S. imports—ACSA could potentially apply to a very 
substantial percentage of U.S. imports. As explained above, 
“covered goods” under ACSA include iron, steel, aluminum, 
cement, bulk glass, and paper, as well as many other unspeci-
fied manufactured goods accounting for “comparable” levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions.51 Thus, ACSA (or any comparable 
legislation to equalize the climate change impact of imports with 
domestically produced goods) could represent a major expan-
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sion of the concept of “unfair trade.” Still, the core concept of 
ACSA’s trade provisions are analogous to U.S. trade remedy 
law in that their purpose is to equalize the competitive impact 
of imports with the same types of goods produced domestically 
through recognition of an “unfair” advantage conferred on the 
imports.
conclusIon
The political will to sharply reduce GHG emissions—at 
least in the United States and the EU—seems to be strong and 
intensifying. The major U.S. presidential candidates all sup-
port the implementation of a national cap-and-trade system to 
reduce greenhouse gases, and all support U.S. participation in 
the UNFCCC process. Senator Baucus has spoken of “the moral 
imperative to deal with climate change.”52 Further, the intro-
duction of ACSA by Senators Lieberman and Warner signals a 
bipartisan consensus for ambitious action on climate change.
However, the “carbon leakage” problem that ACSA’s trade 
provisions attempt to address—a critical component of the 
bill from the perspective of U.S. GHG-emitting manufactur-
ing industries—may also constitute a major hurdle to ACSA’s 
enactment into law. For one, there seems to be significant risk 
that ACSA’s trade provisions, if enacted, could trigger WTO 
complaints against the United States and, potentially, retalia-
tory action to the detriment of U.S. exporters. This risk is one 
reason the current Administration is wary of proposals to penal-
ize importers of GHG-intensive goods, and is instead promoting 
other mechanisms, such as a multilateral EGSA, that would rely 
upon trade liberalization, rather than trade restriction, to com-
bat climate change. However, these objections to ACSA’s trade 
provisions cannot be expected to lessen the concerns of U.S. 
GHG-intensive manufacturing industries which, absent such 
provisions, would likely face declining competitiveness vis-à-
vis their foreign rivals not subject to GHG emissions restrictions 
of the same magnitude as imposed in the United States. These 
U.S. industries can be expected to press for equalizing measures, 
akin to the trade remedy laws, to ensure “fair” competition with 
imported goods manufactured under less stringent GHG emis-
sions standards.
The controversy surrounding ACSA’s trade provisions also 
underscores the imbalance between U.S. domestic and multi-
lateral efforts to reduce GHG emissions. GHG emissions and 
climate change are a problem of the “global commons,” and 
therefore require a globally coordinated approach as embodied 
in the UNFCCC process and Bali Roadmap. Yet, as explained 
above, the Bali Action Plan does not expressly commit devel-
oping countries to undertake reduction in GHG emissions. In 
the face of this asymmetry of commitments between devel-
oped and developing countries, it is reasonable to expect the 
United States (and the EU) to explore domestic laws and other 
mechanisms that would unilaterally attempt to compel countries 
with less stringent GHG emissions standards to tighten them. 
That is what ACSA seeks to do—first through a mandate for 
the Executive Branch to negotiate a global agreement to reduce 
GHG emissions in a coordinated fashion, and second, through 
import requirements that would redress any competitive imbal-
ance experienced by foreign manufacturing industries exporting 
to the United States. 
It remains unclear how much of the burden developing 
countries will accept as the Bali Roadmap process produces a 
successor to the Kyoto Protocol (if it does). But it is clear that, 
the less they do, the greater will be the pressure on U.S. and 
EU lawmakers to ensure, through unilateral trade measures like 
ACSA’s import provisions, that their industries are protected 
from imports produced under less costly emissions standards. 
Political realism suggests that trade mechanisms will be tools of 
choice in this effort—whether or not they are found to comply 
with current WTO rules, the Administration’s trade policy pref-
erences, or the “shared vision” principles espoused in the Bali 
Action Plan.
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